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Abstract  
 
Given that virtually all British passenger train services were franchised out over the period 1995-
7, and many have now been franchised for a second time, Britain should provide an excellent 
opportunity to study the impact of franchising passenger rail services. Moreover, since several 
different franchising models have been tried, there should also be some useful evidence on how 
best to go about franchising. In practice, however, the turbulent history of the British rail industry 
over this period makes drawing firm conclusions difficult. At the start, it appeared that franchising 
was very successful with strong competition for franchises, rapidly rising traffic, rising 
productivity and falling subsidies. Whilst most of the increase in traffic was due to external 
factors, the growth appears somewhat faster than would be explained by these factors alone. 
Despite this, a number of train operating companies got into financial difficulties, particularly in 
the Regional sector, where franchisees were relying on reduced costs rather than increased 
revenues to achieve subsidy reductions, and in the short term franchises were renegotiated or 
replaced with cost-plus contracts pending refranchising. After the bankruptcy of Railtrack not 
only have the costs and performance of the infrastructure manager severely deteriorated, but there 
has also been a large rise in the costs of train operating companies. Without a better understanding 
of the causes of this rise it is hard to form firm conclusions on the success of franchising. One 
argument is that one of the reasons franchisees found it difficult to achieve the anticipated cost 
reductions was the degree to which costs had already been driven down in the 1980s. However 
costs did start to rise again in the early 1990s and in the early years of franchising substantial 
savings in costs per train kilometre were achieved, with cost increases only following later. A 
second suggested explanation for the cost increase is the temporary placing of many Train 
Operating Companies on management contracts or renegotiation of franchises around 2001. We 
have found some support for this hypothesis, with our analysis showing that the affected TOCs 
experienced higher cost growth than other TOCs. A third argument is that the increase in costs in 
the last few years may have been driven by factors unrelated to the franchising process, and in 
particular, other aspects of policy such as health and safety legislation, disability discrimination 
legislation and a general requirement for higher standards. It is hard to be definitive on which of 
these three effects dominates, but we do have evidence which suggests that the way in which 
problem franchises were managed may have contributed substantially to the rise in costs after 
1999/00. Our overall conclusion then is that passenger rail franchising in Britain may be regarded 
as a moderate success on the demand side, but that it has failed to achieve its objectives on the 
cost side. However, it should be noted that the rise in train operating costs in recent years has 
occurred at a time of considerable disruption, during which many other factors unrelated to 
franchising policy were changing at the same time. It remains to be seen what the re-franchising 
process will achieve in terms of cost reduction in a more stable environment. 
 
* We have greatly benefited from comments on an earlier draft by a number of people including, 
Mary Bonar, Richard Davies, Jeremy Drew, Peter Kain, John Glover, Lou Thompson and Steve 
Perkins. Responsibility for the final version is however solely our own.  
1.  Introduction 
 
The principle argument for franchising rail passenger services via a competitive tendering is that it 
permits the preservation of an integrated network of services, subsidised where necessary, whilst 
introducing competitive pressures, leading to incentives to reduce costs and (depending on who 
bears the revenue risk and what other incentives are in place) improve quality of service. 
Compared with the alternative of open access competition as a way of introducing competitive 
pressures into the rail passenger industry, competitive tendering is especially useful in cases in 
which competition in the market is not feasible because of the need for subsidies or a lack of 
capacity.  
 
If it is decided to franchise passenger services, there are many issues about the best way to do it. 
Key questions are: 
•  What pattern of franchise length, control of services and fares and responsibility for 
investment is best? 
•  How large a network should each franchise cover? 
•  How may appropriate incentives be built in to the contract? 
 
As will be seen a number of different approaches to these issues have been tried in Great Britain. 
This, plus the fact that in Great Britain virtually all rail passenger services are subject to 
franchising makes the British experience very relevant.  In the next section we discuss the first 
round of competitive tendering in Great Britain which took place from 1994-7.  We then consider 
the initial approach to franchising under the Strategic Rail Authority.  We discuss the collapse of 
Railtrack and subsequent approaches to franchising before assessing the success of franchising in 
Britain and drawing some final conclusions. 
 
2.  The first round of franchising 
 
The rail industry in Great Britain has by far the most experience of competitive tendering in 
Europe, having moved to a situation where virtually all rail passenger services are competitively 
tendered over the period 1994-7.  Separation of infrastructure from operations in 1994 was 
followed by outright privatisation of the infrastructure manager and the freight operators and by 
franchising of virtually all passenger services, whether short or long distance, profitable or not.  
Initially franchises were typically let for 7 years, on a net cost basis, with a requirement to provide 
at least a minimum level of service but opportunities to run more services than that.  Some fares 
(most season tickets, and either the ordinary or for longer distances the off peak saver) were 
capped. Franchisees lease rolling stock from separate rolling stock leasing companies, so the level 
of investment required is very low, thus reducing barriers to entry. Nevertheless, a few franchises, 
notably that for the West Coast Main Line, were let for periods of up to 15 years, on the basis that 
major investment was involved which would require longer track access agreements and rolling 
stock leases to achieve value for money. 
 
The initial round of franchises is described in table 1.  As will be seen the majority of franchises 
were won by existing transport companies, particularly from the bus industry but also airlines and 
a shipping company. This leads to speculation as to what would have happened at this stage had 
the bus industry not already been privatised. 
    
There were some characteristics of the way franchising was undertaken in Britain which are very 
different from other countries.  For each set of services to be franchised a company was formed. 
Whoever won the franchise took over that company including its staff and assets for the period of 
the franchise.  This may have made entry easier than in a country where the bidder would have to 
recruit staff from scratch, although it may also have imposed less pressure on labour costs.   
Certainly franchising in Britain has attracted a high level of competition, with typically at least 6-
8 serious bidders for each franchise.  Bids were generally awarded on the basis of minimum 
subsidy (or exceptionally highest premium for profitable franchises) and the subsidy profile 
generally declined sharply over the course of the franchise as a result of assumed cost savings 
and/or revenue growth.  
 
Until the Hatfield accident in October 2000, which set off a chain of events culminating in the 
bankruptcy of the infrastructure manager, Railtrack, the franchising process had been largely 
successful.  Traffic had grown substantially (Figure 1). There has been much debate in Britain 
concerning how much of the growth can be attributed to privatisation (through franchising) as 
opposed to other factors, such as the very strong performance of the economy over the post-
privatisation period. In section 6 below we present some evidence to inform this debate.  
 
Whilst initially privatisation raised the level of subsidy, since all the assets were sold and had to 
be leased back at commercial rates, by 1999-2000 subsidies were falling substantially (Table 2).  
In that year the overall level of subsidy had been reduced to some 3.4p per passenger km, with a 
number of inter city and London and South east franchises paying a premium (money paid by the 
franchisee to the government).   
 
Table 1.  Rail Franchises – first round 
 
Subsidy (£m Feb 1997 
prices) 
Franchise Owner  Length  of 
Franchise 
(yrs)  1996/7 
(actual) 
2002/3 
(projected) 
Great Western  MBO/Firstbus  10  61.9  36.9 
South West Trains  Stagecoach  7  63.3  35.7 
Great North Eastern  Sea Containers  7  67.3  .1 
Midland Main Line  National Express 
Group 
10 17.6  -4.4 
Gatwick Express  National Express 
Group 
15 -4.1  -12.0 
LTS Rail  Prism  15  31.1  19.3 
Connex South Central  Connex  7  92.8  35.9 
Chiltern Railways  MBO/Laing  7  17.4  3.3 
Connex South Eastern  Connex  15  136.1  32.6 
South Wales & West  Prism  7½  84.6  44.0 
Cardiff Railways  Prism  7½  22.5  14.3 
Thames Trains  MBO/Go Ahead  7½  43.7  3.8 
Island Line  Stagecoach  5  2.3  1.0* 
North Western  Great Western 
Holdings 
10 192.9  129.7 Subsidy (£m Feb 1997 
prices) 
Franchise Owner  Length  of 
Franchise 
(yrs)  1996/7 
(actual) 
2002/3 
(projected) 
Regional Railways North East  MTL Trust  7  231.1  150.6 
North London Railways  National Express 
Group 
7½ 55.0  20.0 
Thameslink  Goahead/Via  7 yrs 1 mth  18.5  -27.0 
West Coast Trains  Virgin  15  94.4  -3.9 
Scotrail National  Express 
Group 
7 297.1  209.3 
Central Trains  National Express 
Group 
7 204.4  136.6 
Cross Country  Virgin  15  130.0  50.5 
Anglia  GB Railways  7 yrs 3 mths  41.0  6.3 
Great Eastern  First Bus  7 yrs 3 mths  29.0  -9.5 
West Anglia Great Northern  Prism  7 yrs 3 mths  72.6  -14.6 
Merseyrail Electrics  MTL Trust  7  87.6  61.8 
Total subsidy      2090.1  919.3 
Negative Subsidies indicate payment of a premium; MBO stands for Management Buy Out; * 
assumes constant subsidy after year 5. 
Source: OPRAF Annual Report 1996-7 
    
Table 2.  Government support to the rail industry (million pounds, 2003/04 prices) 
 
Central PTE Direct rail Other Freight
Government 
grants
grants support (grants to
the infrastructure
manager)
elements of Govt.
support
grants
1985–86 1607 148 0 115 13 1883
1986–87 1375 127 0 40 11 1553
1987–88 1402 120 0 -442 4 1083
1988–89 901 114 0 -286 3 733
1989–90 727 127 0 352 2 1208
1990–91 889 161 0 614 6 1670
1991–92 1210 161 0 754 1 2126
1992–93 1573 141 0 1146 3 2863
1993–94 1191 214 0 688 5 2099
1994–95 2259 431 0 -577 4 2115
1995–96 2073 438 0 -1989 5 527
1996–97 2133 343 0 -1231 18 1263
1997–98 1629 428 0 29 33 2119
1998–99 1334 376 0 59 32 1802
1999–00 1124 340 0 82 25 1572
2000–01 901 301 0 89 38 1329
2001–02 768 321 719 110 60 1978
2002–03 958 312 1195 188 50 2703
2003-04 1359 414 1670 179 32 3654
Year Total Govt. 
support
 
 
Source: National Rail Trends Yearbook 2004-2005, SRA, p. 47. 
Note The negative entries in the figure for other elements of government support are receipts from 
sale of assets. Positive elements are loans for investment. Whether either of these really constitute 
elements of government support may be open to doubt.  
 
3.  Refranchising – the first approach 
 
When the Labour party took office in 1997, it wished to see a major expansion in the rail market. 
Its 10 year plan for transport showed investment in the rail industry of £49bn, with £11bn of 
public money leveraging in £34bn of private. Of course, any private money injected ultimately 
has to be paid for, plus a private sector rate of return, either through the farebox, or through 
increased government subsidies in the future. 
 
Its strategy for achieving this was as follows (SRA, 2001).  Firstly, a new strategic body was to be 
established, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), which took over the role of franchising but also 
had responsibility for strategic planning and for the planning of major investment projects 
requiring coordination between different parts of the industry.  The SRA was initially established 
in shadow form by bringing together the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, the remaining 
functions of the British Railways Board and some Department of Transport Environment and the Regions staff.  But it had to wait for the passage of the 1999 Transport Act to be fully constituted 
as the SRA in February 2001.   
 
The second part of the strategy concerned refranchising. The majority of the first round of 
franchises were for around 7 years and would soon start to fall due for refranchising   The SRA 
saw refranchising as an opportunity to agree a smaller number of longer (20 year) franchises, 
conditional on performance and on implementation of much more ambitious investment plans.  It 
saw longer franchises as encouraging greater investment, although some commentators observed 
that short franchises might lead to companies eager to retain the franchises investing even towards 
the end of the franchises (Steer, 2001).   
 
It might be questioned why longer franchises were necessary given that, as stated above, train 
operating companies were themselves responsible for little investment. One issue was the 
question of who would bear the risk of the unexpired value of rolling stock at the end of the 
franchises. Initially the rolling stock leasing companies were unwilling to bear this, so longer 
franchises paving the way to longer leases were seen as necessary to achieve significant rolling 
stock investment. As time passed so they become more willing to invest without a long term, or 
even any, lease, although arguably the risks involved still led to high leasing charges.  SRA had 
the powers to underwrite longer leases to remove this risk but at this stage was reluctant to use 
them, except in exceptional circumstances, such as the requirement to build new suburban stock in 
advance of refranchising to meet requirements imposed by the Health and Safety Executive for 
the phasing out of Mark 1 stock.  
 
But the main reason for longer franchises was to involve train operating companies in 
infrastructure investment. In the original structure of the industry, this investment would be 
financed by Railtrack, remunerated by the train operating company and where necessary subsidies 
under the franchise agreement would reflect the non commercial element of the costs.  SRA from 
its formation as a ‘shadow’ authority doubted the ability of Railtrack to finance and manage 
investment on the scale necessary, and sought another way forward – the so-called ‘Special 
Purpose Vehicle’.  Rail infrastructure has the problem that, even where commercially justified, 
time horizons are long and risks high, and that makes it relatively unattractive to the private 
sector.  By selectively intervening to provide longer term funding SRA believed it could lever in 
substantial private funding.  
 
The idea was that major infrastructure improvements would be financed from a variety of sources, 
including train operating companies, private financiers, and the SRA in the form of grants or 
loans, but the latter being ‘patient capital’.  At completion, Railtrack would buy the assets and 
recover the costs through its normal process of access charges, thus releasing capital for further 
projects.  The first example of funding of this sort was indeed the Channel Tunnel high speed rail 
link.  Initially, Railtrack opposed this approach, claiming that it could finance and manage all the 
investment itself provided that the Regulator permitted it to make appropriate profits to keep its 
share price reasonably high.  However, following the financial crisis resulting from the Hatfield 
accident referred to above, Railtrack’s share price fell precipitously and it accepted that it could 
no longer fund or manage all these projects itself.  
 
SRA opened negotiations on a number of franchises earlier than was necessary, on the basis that 
the incumbent might be persuaded to relinquish the franchise early in return for the opportunity to 
bid for a long term more attractive franchise.  It sought a wide range of proposals rather than    
being prescriptive on what new investment and improvements in service the offer should contain.  
The result was a difficult process in which SRA had to weigh up such issues as realism and past 
delivery of performance against ambitious plans for the future; a much more difficult task than 
simply comparing the subsidy bids for a stipulated set of services.  The process therefore took a 
lot more time than was originally expected; only a small number of franchises were surrendered 
early, and only one of the new long term franchises (for Chiltern Railways) was actually signed 
before the policy changed again.  
 
In the meantime, it was already clear that whilst those franchisees that relied on growth in revenue 
to meet their financial targets were achieving profits, those where farebox revenue was small 
relative to costs, and where therefore cost reduction was the key to success, were in difficulties 
(Table 3).  This problem particularly impacted on regional TOCs and, even though regional 
passenger growth has been comparable with that achieved by long-distance and London and 
South East TOCs, the fact that passenger revenue makes up a smaller proportion of total revenue 
means that these TOCs are more reliant on cost savings in order to maintain profitability in the 
face of falling subsidies. 
 
In particular two operators – MTL and PRISM – were by 2000 believed to be close to bankruptcy.  
The SRA was faced with a choice of either taking over operation itself pending refranchising or 
renegotiating the franchises.  In both cases, a deal was negotiated whereby the operator was taken 
over by another operator (MTL by Arriva, PRISM by National Express), and a ‘cost plus’ contract 
negotiated for the loss making services until refranchising took place (strictly this was a contract 
under which the level of payment was negotiated annually on the basis of projected costs; the 
TOC therefore retained some cost risks). Renegotiation followed on other regional TOCs, without 
a change of control, either to renegotiate the terms of the original franchise to provide more 
subsidy (Central Trains and Scotrail) or to move other regional TOCs (First North Western) on to 
cost plus contracts pending refranchising in due course. All these renegotiations were associated 
with redrawing of the boundaries of adjacent companies to achieve what was seen as more 
appropriate groupings of services, and this also delayed refranchising until the boundary changes 
could be completed.   
 
Of course, the problem faced by the regional TOCs was not inevitable and could have been 
averted at the franchise bidding stage by a more successful elimination of unrealistic bids. 
However, franchises that were let later in the process, which included many of the regional TOCs, 
tended to see more aggressive subsidy reduction profiles than for those let at the beginning of the 
process (see Kain, 1998). This observation has led to the conclusion that many of the later bids 
were over-optimistic; and, to the further concern that the winning bidders may have intentionally 
bid strategically, with the aim of re-negotiating the agreements at a later date. In section 6 we 
consider this point in further detail and ask, if this was the case, whether it turned out to be a 
profitable strategy for the TOCs concerned.  
Table 3.  Rail Industry Profitability 
 
Operating Profit, 1998/9 
(losses in brackets) 
  £m  % of turnover 
Inter City Operators  90.8  5.5 
Network South East Operators  93.7  4.7 
Regional Operators  (6.2)  (0.4) 
 
of which 
  
North West Trains  (5.1)  (2.1) 
Wales and West  (12.6)  (9.6) 
Cardiff Railways  (4.9)  (18.8) 
Source:  TAS Rail Monitor, 2000 
 
Two other franchises were the subject of early replacement; the two London commuter area 
franchises won by Connex. In the case of South Central, it was agreed that Connex would 
surrender the franchise early in order to get the opportunity of bidding for a longer franchise 
which was won by Go Via. In practice, before final negotiations were concluded franchising 
policy had changed again (see below) and only a 7 year contract was agreed. Whilst this process 
was going on, Go Via ran the services under a cost plus contract. After this, Connex also lost its 
other franchise, South East Trains.  Connex having once negotiated a higher subsidy, and then 
gone back for more, the Strategic Rail Authority terminated its franchise and took its operation in 
house pending refranchising on completion of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, when the two would 
be franchised together. 
 
4.  The collapse of Railtrack 
 
In October 2000, a fatal accident at Hatfield was attributed to the state of the track. Following this, 
severe speed restrictions were put in place across the network, and track renewals greatly 
accelerated.  The effect of this was a major increase in costs, leading to a big increase in the level 
of government support for the industry.  Support more than doubled between 2000/01 and 
2002/03 mainly because of the introduction of substantial direct grants from the Strategic Rail 
Authority to Network Rail, and continued rising (although it should be noted that the decision to 
introduce direct grants to Railtrack was taken during the 2000 Periodic Review, prior to the 
Hatfield accident).  At the same time, Railtrack was in great trouble with its biggest project the 
West Coast Main Line upgrading, the cost of which had more than quadrupled whilst it was 
running many years late. It also had to pay substantial compensation to TOCs for poor 
performance. 
 
The result of all this was the placing of Railtrack in administration and its replacement by a ‘not-
for-profit’ company, Network Rail. Network Rail is legally a company limited by guarantee.  It 
has no shareholders, but rather ‘members’, who are said to take the place of shareholders in terms 
of powers such as removing the Board of Directors but have no financial stake in the company.  
These members are of three types – representatives of the rail industry (including the 
government), representatives of other stakeholder organisations (such as the Rail Passenger 
Council and Transport 2000) and individuals.      
 
Network Rail finances itself by means of loans, and ultimately these loans have been underwritten 
by the government.  The government also provides Network Rail with substantial direct funding 
for its operations as well as contributing indirectly by subsidies to Train Operating Companies.  
Thus whilst the government insists that Network Rail is a private company, it seems more 
appropriate to regard Network Rail as an experiment in a new form of public ownership of the 
infrastructure. 
 
The big problems that emerged after the Hatfield accident in 2000 mostly concerned the 
infrastructure manager.  To the extent the Train Operating Companies were compensated for 
delays and unreliability, their finances should not have been affected.  However, there was also a 
problem concerning some of the train operators.  This particularly affected the two Virgin 
franchises, whose revenue projections were always ambitious but in the light of the failure of 
Railtrack to provide infrastructure for the speed and reliability of services planned became clearly 
impossible. In the case of Cross Country, an ambitious new timetable had to be cut back to 
improve reliability, and failed to restore a seriously loss making operation to profitability. West 
Coast Trains was due to move from receipt of subsidy to payment of a premium, upon completion 
of the West Coast upgrade, but this was both scaled down and running late. Therefore these two 
inter city franchises followed the regional ones in being placed on a cost plus contract basis 
pending either renegotiation or refranchising. 
 
Thus a situation was reached where a substantial proportion of franchises were either re-
negotiated with higher subsidy, or subject to annual negotiation on a cost plus basis, again with 
higher subsidy (Table 4). It should be stressed however that this situation came about and 
persisted for as long as it did in times of exceptional uncertainty, where refranchising had been 
temporarily halted because post Hatfield the money was simply not available for the sort of long 
run high investment franchises that had been foreseen in the early days of the SRA, and where 
there were other delays due to redrawing the franchise map. It was never the intention in the 
majority of cases to renegotiate long term franchises without refranchising and indeed many of the 
TOCs that were for a period on cost plus or renegotiated franchises have now been refranchised.  
Whether or not this is seen as a reasonable short run expedient in the circumstances, there must be 
concern that this reduced pressure on costs, and we return to this question again in section 6.   
 Table 4.  TOCs subject to re-negotiated franchise agreements or cost-plus contracts  
 
Cardiff Railways  Sept 2000 – Dec 2003 (cost-plus contract) 
Central Trains  2001-2004 (re-negotiated) 
South Central  2001 – 2003 (cost-plus contract) 
South Eastern  2002 – 2003 (re-negotiated) 
Virgin Cross country  From 2002 (cost-plus contract) 
C2C  2001-2011 (re-negotiated)  
Merseyrail  2001 – 2003 (cost-plus contract) 
Northern Spirit  2001 – 2004 (cost-plus contract) 
North Western  2001 – 2004 (cost-plus contract)  
Scotrail  2001 – 2004 (re-negotiated) 
WAGN  From 2001 (cost-plus contract) 
Wales & West  From 2001 (cost-plus contract) 
Virgin West Coast  From 2002 (cost-plus contract) 
Source   own compilation based on SRA annual reports and TAS rail monitors 
 
Figure 1.  Rail Passenger and Freight Volumes (1979 to 2004/05)  
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5.  The current position on franchising 
 
After a period following the problems caused by the Hatfield accident, when refranchising was 
halted and short extensions to existing franchises negotiated, the SRA’s policy under new 
chairman Richard Bowker saw a return to 7 years as the typical franchise period, with extensions 
of up to 3 years possible if justified by performance. Where new rolling stock was required SRA 
generally used its powers to underwrite a longer lease.  Funding for the major upgrades envisaged 
in the 10 year plan was no longer available since it was needed for maintaining and renewing the    
existing system, and only one SPV – as part of a 20 year franchise for the Chiltern line was ever 
concluded.  One other long run franchise, for 25 years was concluded for Merseyrail, but 
responsibility for that had been devolved to the Passenger Transport Executive.   
 
The aim of the new policy was to restore confidence in the industry, and in the franchising model, 
after a period of turmoil. Efforts were therefore made to simplify the model through much more 
tightly defined franchise agreements, specifying in much more detail the services to be provided 
(it being considered that under the previous more flexible arrangements additional train kilometres 
had often been introduced which were damaging overall in terms of their impact on other services 
and on reliability) and lay down much stricter conditions regarding a whole range of quality of 
service indicators, and share revenue risk – previously this was borne entirely by the franchisee.  
 
The current situation in terms of franchises is shown in Table 5. After some initial reductions in 
the early years, subsidies to train operators are again rising and are now considerably higher than 
envisaged at privatisation; indeed they are almost back to the level at the start of the process. The 
rise in subsidies is driven predominantly by a sharp rise in train operator costs (including the cost 
of leasing rolling stock), as will be discussed in the next section. It should be noted that the 2000 
Periodic Review of Railtrack’s finances led to a fall in rail access charges of about £200m, in 
2001/02, which means that subsidy payments to TOCs were reduced by the same amount in that 
year. The comparison between actual and projected subsidy levels is therefore even less 
favourable than that shown in Table 5
1. Given the proposed increase in track access charges 
following the 2003 review of Network Rail’s cost levels, further subsidy rises should be foreseen 
in the future (although the way in which these are being phased over time means that access 
charges for TOCs, and therefore subsidies to the TOC sector, actually fell substantially in 2004/05 
but will rise sharply in future years). 
 
Throughout the period since privatisation substantial concentration has taken place in the TOC 
sector, with National Express holding no fewer than 11 of the franchises.  However, almost all 
franchise invitations have been followed by strong competition between several players and only 
on one occasion (that of Central Trains, where only two bidders prequalified) has a franchise 
contest been halted because of lack of adequate competition. 
 
                                                      
1 Although the impact of lower access charges on TOC subsidies reduces in 2002/03 and 2003/04 as access charges 
increased by 5% in real terms in both of those years compared with their 2001/02 levels. Table 5: Subsidies to Passenger Train Operators (including performance incentive 
payments)  
 
(£m, 2003/04 prices) 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Anglia 41 30 26 20 -2 -1 4
Cardiff/Wales and Borders 24 19 20 18 57 92 123
Central trains 198 180 159 140 130 97 140
Chiltern 16 14 11 10 14 19 24
Connex South Central 87 65 55 44 14 -2 78
Connex South Eastern 131 96 70 47 42 38 128
Cross Country 132 113 95 85 125 211 246
Gatwick Express -7 -9 -11 -12 -7 -5 -13
Great Eastern 33 16 10 -5 -26 -41 -33
GNER 63 42 19 7 -30 -28 -25
Great Western 67 59 53 45 29 9 30
Island Line 2222233
L T S / C 2 C 3 22 92 72 61 52 12 0
Merseyrail 75 67 60 57 82 65 21
Midland Mainline 9310 - 7 - 1 5 - 4
North Western 210 191 176 156 182 180 190
Northern Spirit 250 221 197 180 212 201 240
Scotrail 281 264 246 216 174 189 266
Silverlink 56 40 33 27 45 47 52
South West 71 67 63 51 19 25 106
Thameslink 3 -8 -19 -29 -40 -55 -44
Thames Trains 38 26 17 12 -4 -14 -9
WAGN 62 40 29 9 16 -8 8
Wales and West/Wessex 84 71 68 55 73 52 76
West Coast 87 78 64 62 201 194 332
Transpennine Express 000000 3 0
Total 2,046 1,717 1,470 1,223 1,315 1,273 1,990
Projected subsidy from initial bids 1,994 1,758 1,499 1,323 1,192 984
Note: projected subsidy levels exclude performance bonuses and penalties and any changes to track access
resulting from the 2000 Periodic Review
Source: SRA Annual Reports and Statistical Yearbooks  
 
 
The complete history of each franchise is summarised in the Appendix.  One curious thing is 
apparent.  It was expected that a typical problem with franchising would occur – that the 
incumbent would start with a major advantage in terms of knowledge of costs and markets.  In 
fact of the twelve franchises to be refranchised so far, only three have gone to the main incumbent 
(although the alterations to franchise boundaries mean that in many cases a transfer of some 
services was inevitable). Yet many of the incumbents then went on to win new franchises in 
different parts of the country.  Moreover, whilst some companies have left the industry, new 
entrants have arrived, including SERCO and Nedrail, with other new competitors not so far 
successful including other railways such as DSB and freight operator EWS.  It is clear that 
competition for franchises remains healthy in terms of the number of competitors, although the 
recent cost and subsidy increases might lead us to conclude that all is not well with the passenger 
rail franchising model in Britain.   
 
 
 
    
6.  An assessment  
 
It will be seen therefore that the process of franchising in Britain has been a mixed experience.  
Whilst initially it worked as foreseen in reducing costs and increasing in traffic, the latter was at 
least temporarily slowed down by the aftermath of the Hatfield accident, whilst the reduction in 
costs has given way to strong growth in costs.  
 
Table 6 shows the extent of the cost shock experienced by Britain’s rail industry since the Hatfield 
accident. Whilst the infrastructure cost explosion is well known, Table 6 shows that the annual 
cash cost of passenger train operations, including rolling stock capital investment, has risen very 
sharply as well over the same period. This increase cannot be explained simply by new services, 
since costs per passenger train km have increased by nearly half in real terms since 1999/00, the 
last financial year before Hatfield, whilst passenger kilometres grew more slowly than train 
kilometres over this period. 
 
Table 6: Total Rail Industry Cash Costs: 1999/91 to 2003/04 
 
Costs (2003/04 prices) 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Infrastructure
Maintenance 864 804 775 723 761 995 1,214 1,245
Renewals and enhancements 1,201 1,430 1,614 1,837 2,598 2,969 3,246 3,974
Other operating costs 779 764 785 788 813 1,157 1,233 1,309
2,845 2,998 3,174 3,348 4,172 5,121 5,693 6,528
Passenger train operations  2,556 2,514 2,840 2,744 3,391 3,925 4,151 4,357
(including rolling stock costs). Note 1
Freight costs 452 552 543 491 510 620 564 579
Total industry cash costs 6,279 5,493 5,473 5,691 5,852 6,064 6,557 6,582 8,073 9,665 10,408 11,464
Unit cost measures
Total cash cost per train km 16.0 14.1 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.8 14.9 14.5 17.5 20.4 21.7 23.8
Infrastructure cash cost per train km 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.4 9.0 10.8 11.9 13.5
Passenger train operating costs per pass. train km 6.8 6.7 7.0 6.6 7.9 9.0 9.4 9.8
Note 1: includes operating and capital expenditure costs. Sources: see Smith (2006).
Post-privatisation period
Pre-Hatfield Post-Hatfield period
Pre-privatisation
 
 
 
Nor can the increase be explained simply in terms of the high levels of investment in rolling stock 
that we have seen in recent years. Table 7 focuses on operating costs only and, in addition, 
attempts to identify the element of TOC operating costs that are internal to the operators – that is, 
TOC costs, excluding payments for access to the infrastructure and train lease payments (paid by 
TOCs to the rolling stock companies). Table 7 shows that the TOC’s own operating costs have 
also increased by nearly 50% since Hatfield. Furthermore, whilst increased staff numbers and 
higher wage rates explains part of the growth, the majority of it remains unexplained, within the 
“other costs” category.  
 
The difference between the experience of franchising in rail and bus de-regulation in Britain, in 
terms of the impact on staff rates of pay, is striking, with wage rates falling sharply in the bus 
industry, but rising sharply in the passenger rail sector. This difference may be explained in part 
by the fact that in Britain when a rail service changes operator, the new operator takes over the existing company including its staff, whereas in the bus industry, where a new operator would 
come in with its own staff, the threat to existing staff is much greater. It has also been suggested 
that pressure on wages is reduced by the stronger commitment by government to the maintenance 
of rail services compared with bus, and also by the relative ease with which new bus drivers can 
be trained, relative to train drivers (see Glaister, 2004). Glaister (2004) argues that over-optimism 
about the ability to cut staff wages and costs amongst bus companies bidding for the passenger 
rail franchises was one of the reasons for the financial problems experienced by many of the 
TOCs post-privatisation.  
 
Possible explanations for the rise in other costs might include rising fuel costs over this period 
(though data is not available for the majority of TOCs, power costs per train km for Virgin Cross 
Country services increased by 55% between 1999/00 and 2003/04, driven by sharply rising diesel 
prices) and increased commission on ticket sales paid to other TOCs as passenger kilometres have 
increased.  
 
It should also be noted that in attempting to isolate TOC own non-staff costs from payments to 
third parties for rolling stock leasing and maintenance and access to the infrastructure, we have 
used the corresponding income data from the company accounts of the three ROSCOs as well as 
Network Rail (and formerly Railtrack)
2. It is possible that the income reported in those 
companies’ accounts differs in detail from that reported in the TOC accounts (although our 
discussions with the industry do not indicate any reason to expect major discrepancies), which 
means that we may have underestimated third party payments, therefore resulting in an 
overestimate of TOC own non-staff costs (of course, it is also possible that any error might go the 
other way, therefore implying that we have underestimated TOC own costs). Furthermore, the 
recent trend towards TOCs taking direct responsibility for rolling stock maintenance, or paying 
manufacturers direct for heavy maintenance (as in the case of the Virgin TOCs) might distort the 
comparison for similar reasons.  
 
Of course, whatever the true picture of TOC non-staff costs, the increase in staff costs is very 
clear, and there remains the question as to whether the staff costs rise is reasonable. There is 
anecdotal evidence that part of the increase in staff costs represents the impact of neighbouring 
TOCs seeking to recruit trained staff (especially drivers) from each other, in which case it is 
possible that the franchising process has actually driven costs up in this respect. It is also argued 
that new rolling stock (with improvements such as sliding doors, air conditioning, retention toilets 
and on-board information systems) will have raised maintenance costs, and also led to training 
costs during the period of introduction; the initial poor reliability of much of the new stock will 
also have raised costs. In addition, TOCs have invested in revenue protection and improved on 
board and at station services, in an attempt to improve profitability rather than simply to hold 
down costs. Tighter specification of quality, in terms of factors such as cleaning and provision of 
information may also have raised costs. Further research is clearly required in this key area, in 
order to obtain a totally reliable picture of TOC own costs, separate from payments to third 
parties, and to provide a clearer explanation of the reasons for the rises in costs We are continuing 
our research on these issues. 
 
                                                      
2 Since TOCs do not always      report access charge and rolling stock payments in their company accounts.     
 
Table 7: Drivers of TOC cost rises 
 
Drivers of TOC cost rises 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 Post-HF
(£m, 2003/04 prices) % growth
TOC own costs 2,149 2,076 2,090 2,099 2,473 2,681 2,981 3,097 47.5%
- Of which, staff costs 1,063 1,021 1,030 1,037 1,086 1,180 1,297 1,376 32.7%
- Of which, other costs 1,086 1,055 1,060 1,062 1,387 1,501 1,684 1,720 62.0%
Average salary 24,352 25,333 26,254 26,556 27,008 27,793 28,837 30,426 14.6%
Headcount 43,638 40,290 39,231 39,049 40,196 42,470 44,968 45,236 15.8%
Passenger train km - million 374 376 405 418 427 436 443 446 6.6%
Passenger km - billion 32.1 34.7 36.3 38.5 38.2 39.1 39.7 40.9 6.2%
 
 
As noted earlier, the SRA’s decision to re-negotiate contracts, and put TOCs onto temporary cost-
plus contracts might have been expected to weaken incentives for cost control amongst the 
affected TOCs. Indeed, one of the classic problems of franchising is that the initial bids may tend 
to be too optimistic, leading to a subsequent re-negotiation with the franchising authority. Over-
optimistic bids might be the result of poor information, leading to the “winner’s curse”, or of 
strategic bidding, where operators bid strategically with a view to re-negotiating the contract at a 
later date. 
 
Table 8 shows the profitability (measured as a percentage of total revenue) of the TOC sector, and 
each individual TOC, over the period since privatisation. A number of points are worth noting. 
First of all, the profitability of the TOC sector as a whole improved in the first few years after 
privatisation, took a fall in 2000/01, the year of the Hatfield accident, and has since rebounded 
sharply, far exceeding the levels seen before the Hatfield accident. So whilst passenger have 
endured poor punctuality performance during the post-Hatfield period, costs have risen, and the 
government has increased subsidy levels substantially, the train operators have enjoyed rising 
profitability. There is a question as to what the appropriate rate of profit should be for a franchised 
passenger rail operating company given the unusual nature of the business, with little investment 
directly undertaken by the TOC itself. But it appears that the increase in TOC profits in total 
comes mainly as a result of eliminating losses in loss making TOCs and bringing them up to 
something closer to the industry norm, rather than increasing profits in profitable ones.  In other 
words, the process did succeed in overcoming the financial problems of certain TOCs referred to 
earlier. 
 Table 8: TOC profitability as a percentage of turnover 
 
TOCs on re-negotiated or cost-plus contracts AFI* 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04
(excluding Virgin TOCs)
Cardiff/Wales and Borders 20.0% -6.9% -18.8% -21.9% -12.6% 4.3% 7.3% 7.3%
Central trains 13.0% 0.7% 0.6% -2.3% -8.4% -14.3% -3.1% -3.1%
Connex South Central 5.0% -1.3% 0.6% 2.9% 2.5% -3.0% 2.7% 6.6%
Connex South Eastern 7.0% 1.5% 0.6% 1.4% 1.1% -0.2% -2.0% -4.1%
C2C 4.0% 7.4% 8.6% 18.5% -5.8% -1.3% -2.9% 0.6%
Merseyrail 17.0% 5.7% 3.2% -0.7% -4.1% 2.3% 8.8% 9.3%
North Western 19.0% -0.3% -4.1% -6.0% -27.3% 4.1% 1.4% 1.4%
Northern Spirit 16.0% 2.3% 0.5% -6.4% -8.5% 3.3% 5.9% 6.9%
Scotrail 10.0% -0.7% 0.4% 0.4% -3.2% -12.8% -2.5% -3.2%
WAGN 7.0% 5.7% 4.9% 3.9% 0.1% 4.4% 7.3% 6.8%
Wales and West/Wessex 14.0% -3.2% -9.9% -9.7% -10.1% 2.1% 6.9% 6.2%
Average 12.0% 1.0% -1.2% -1.8% -6.9% -1.0% 2.7% 3.1%
Virgin TOCs AFI* 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04
Cross Country 11.0% 0.7% -3.3% -8.0% -16.1% -11.2% -9.9% 8.4%
West Coast 7.0% 2.8% 9.3% 11.8% 9.2% 12.2% 10.2% 3.8%
Average 9.0% 1.7% 3.0% 1.9% -3.4% 0.5% 0.2% 6.1%
Other TOCs AFI* 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04
Anglia 13.0% 3.3% 2.2% -1.8% -0.9% -1.7% -0.2% 1.9%
Great Western 2.0% 8.6% 7.6% 11.5% 11.6% 8.5% 7.4% 7.2%
GNER 4.0% 3.4% 3.0% 3.2% 6.9% 10.2% 14.1% 11.1%
Midland Mainline 4.0% 4.2% 3.7% 2.4% 7.7% 6.8% 8.0% 7.6%
Chiltern 8.0% 4.0% 2.5% 2.6% 0.7% 5.6% 7.9% 8.1%
Great Eastern 5.0% 4.3% 6.6% 7.1% 19.3% 14.9% 12.9% 8.3%
Silverlink 9.0% 0.8% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 1.8% 0.4% 2.5%
Thameslink 8.0% 6.2% 7.6% 9.2% 11.5% 11.1% 9.1% 8.9%
Thames Trains 10.0% 5.3% 4.6% 3.4% 3.5% 1.3% -1.2% -1.2%
Island Line 7.0% -21.1% 6.4% 5.1% 1.4% 8.0% 9.6% 9.6%
Gatwick Express 4.0% 10.0% 10.6% 10.6% 13.7% 14.3% 5.4% -12.1%
Average excluding Gatwick Express** 7.0% 1.9% 4.7% 4.6% 6.4% 6.6% 6.8% 6.4%
All TOC profitability (weighted average) 2.5% 2.8% 2.9% 1.1% 2.8% 4.4% 4.6%
* Average annual improvement required to match subsidy reductions over the period to 2002/03. Source, Kain (1998). 
** The losses in 2003/04 distort the comparison so are excluded  
 
 
Since the circumstances surrounding the Virgin TOCs being placed onto cost-plus contracts are 
somewhat different from those of the other TOCs, the former have been separately identified in 
the table. It can be clearly seen that the TOCs which have run into trouble are those that were 
based on the most aggressive subsidy profiles, as measured by the implied annual financial 
improvement (AFI) required to match the proposed subsidy reductions.  
 
However, if strategic bidding is the explanation for poor performance and re-negotiation in 
respect of the “problem” TOCs, it does not appear that this was a particularly profitable strategy. 
The problem TOCs made substantial losses for four of the years after privatisation and, even after 
re-negotiation, profitability levels remain below those of the rest of the TOC sector (though the 
averages do hide substantial variations by TOC). The Virgin story is very complex, although we 
note that by the end of the period Virgin does appear to have done well relative to the sector as a 
whole, and its profitability is broadly in line with other long distance operators.  
    
 
Turning to the question of whether the SRA’s decision to re-negotiate contracts weakened 
incentives for cost control, Table 9 below compares the unit cost (per train kilometre) growth 
between those TOCs on cost-plus or renegotiated contracts and the remaining TOCs. The analysis 
is based on TOC costs including rolling stock costs, since it was not possible satisfactorily to 
separately identify payments for rolling stock in the TOC accounts. Likewise, not all TOCs report 
payments for track access in their accounts fully (or at all in some cases). This problem was 
addressed by using a detailed dataset provided by Network Rail which shows Railtrack / Network 
Rail passenger access charge revenue by TOC for the period 1998/99 to 2003/04. Owing to the 
particular circumstances surrounding the re-negotiation of the Virgin TOC franchises, these are 
shown separately.  
 
The data in Table 9 shows that those TOCs on cost-plus or re-negotiated contracts (with the 
exception of the Virgin TOCs) had a much higher growth in costs than the other operators over 
this period. This finding provides support for the hypothesis that the SRA’s decision to re-
negotiate contracts, and put TOCs onto cost-plus contracts, weakened incentives for cost control 
amongst the affected TOCs as compared with the rest of the sector. An alternative hypothesis is 
that it is those TOCs with the largest cost increases which ran into trouble, although the cost 
increases reported here occurred mainly after the companies had got into trouble and entered 
negotiations regarding their franchise agreements. 
 
It should be noted that in the previous version of this paper - presented at the January 2006 
workshop - we found no evidence to support the claim that TOCs on cost-plus or re-negotiated 
contracts had seen higher cost growth. The difference is that the previous analysis was based on 
more limited data and a smaller sample size of “problem” companies. Further analysis is required 
to understand the differences between the two analyses more fully, particularly as it may be 
sensitive to whether one or two TOCs are included in the “problem” TOC companies. However, 
we are more confident in the most recent findings as they are based on a larger sample of problem 
TOCs. 
 
 
Table 9: TOC cost growth by TOC-type 
 
TOC type  Growth in TOC costs per train km (excluding 
access charge payments, but including 
payments to ROSCOs): 1999/00 to 2003/04 
 
 
TOCs on cost-plus or re-negotiated contracts 
 
 
33% 
 
Virgin TOCs 
 
 
5% 
 
Balance of TOC sector 
 
 
17% 
 
 
 On the demand side it is clear that passenger demand has risen very sharply after privatisation. 
What is less clear is whether this is due to the introduction of private sector skills, combined with 
the strong incentives provided by the franchise contracts, or due to external factors. Figures 2 to 4 
show the growth in demand in its historical context. The aim is to compare the upturn in demand 
in 1990s with the boom in the 1980s. If we take the trough of demand in 1994/95 as the starting 
point for privatisation, the post-privatisation growth does look unusually strong, indicating a 
major privatisation effect on demand.  
 
However, if we use the economic cycle to define our start and end points, the upturn in the 
economy began two years earlier in 1992/93, and the growth in demand from that point looks less 
impressive and more closely in line with the 1980s boom, except perhaps for London and the 
South East. This result comes, of course, because demand continued to fall in the early 1990s 
even after the economy had started to recover, which itself could be attributed to privatisation (in 
the sense that managers were focused on restructuring, rather than on running the business).  
 
Nevertheless, as already noted, there are a number of factors, other than GDP, that need to be 
taken into account in analysing passenger rail demand, and we can therefore not rely on the 
simple analysis shown in Figures 2 to 4. Table 10 shows the results of some recent work carried 
out by Professor Mark Wardman at ITS aimed at disentangling these effects.  For a large sample 
of flows (but excluding season tickets), the table shows the level of traffic growth that would have 
been predicted had rail fares and services remained unchanged for the period, and the degree to 
which this may be explained by population, GDP, car ownership and car journey time and costs. 
A distinct change in trend post privatisation (post-1995) is found, accounting for some 20% of the 
growth for London and South East, although somewhat lower for non-London flows, but other 
factors dominate, and in particular GDP effects. It is this 20% which may be due to improved 
marketing or other unmeasured factors following privatisation. It should be noted that the study 
only goes up to 1998, so it represents very much the first period of the new structure, with the last 
of the franchises only being let in 1997. Unpublished work on the post Hatfield period, 2002-4, 
identifies no ongoing impact on demand, with the trend being fully explained by other 
explanatory variables.  
    
Figure 2: Long distance passenger demand and GDP growth 1978 to 2004/05 
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Figure 3: Regional passenger demand and GDP growth 1978 to 2004/05 
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 Figure 4: London and South East passenger demand and GDP growth 1978 to 2004/05 
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Table 10: Rail Demand Growth 1990-1998: Separating the Impact of External Variables 
from the Post-Privatisation Trend  
 
  London Non London South East 
External variables   
GDP  1.301  (1) 1.196  (1) 1.149  (1) 
Car Time  1.043  (4) 1.031  (4) 1.067  (3) 
Car fuel Cost  1.045  (3) 1.056  (2) 1.049  (5) 
Population  1.038  (5) 1.022  (6) 1.055  (4) 
Car Ownership  0.975  (6) 0.951  (3) 0.972  (6) 
Product of the above  1.435 1.266 1.319 
   
Post- privatisation trend  1.119  (2) 1.033  (5) 1.092  (2) 
   
Total 1.606 1.307  1.440 
Note: Figures denote the proportionate change in demand in the period attributable to this 
variable. Rankings of the magnitudes of each effect are given in parentheses. The overall growth 
is what it is estimated would have happened for the group of services concerned in the absence of 
specific rail management decisions, in terms of changes in services and fares.  
Source: Wardman (2005) 
 
Finally, having considered trends in costs and demand, we might also ask what has happened to 
quality over this period. The big picture is that prior to Hatfield punctuality was improving,    
though largely due to the efforts of Railtrack, rather than the operators (see Figure 5), but that 
post-Hatfield punctuality deteriorated very sharply. The latter deterioration was mainly due to 
problems on the infrastructure side, but delays attributed to TOCs also increased substantially 
after Hatfield, and are recovering only slowly.  
 
However, there are other measures of quality that are important. Passengers presumably benefit 
from newer rolling stock for a variety of reasons (for example, improved ambience and the 
introduction of air conditioning on new trains). The average age of rolling stock has fallen sharply 
from 20.7 years in 2000 to 14.7 in 2005, even though the benefits of this change in terms of 
punctuality are not yet apparent. At the same time, rail complaints are falling, and customer 
satisfaction levels are rising (in terms of the overall opinion of journey); although customer 
satisfaction in terms of the key measure of value for money is falling. Meanwhile, safety has 
continued to improve and, according to Evans (2004) at a faster rate than before privatisation. On 
the negative side, overcrowding on services continues to get worse. Overall then, there are signs 
of improved quality in a number of areas in recent years; there is a question as to whether the 
benefits of these quality improvements are as high as the cost increases with which they are 
associated, but many of the forces driving them were independent of the franchising process.  
 
Figure 5: Delay minutes on Britain’s rail network  
 
 
Source: Network Rail 2004 Technical Plan, Section 10.  
7.  Conclusions 
 
The events befalling the British rail network in recent years make for a confusing picture and 
therefore it is not easy to draw conclusions from the British experience. However, several points 
stand out. 
 
Firstly, there has almost invariably been a high level of competition for franchises in Britain, with 
four or five bidders shortlisted out of a wider field. In many countries we understand that the 
number of bidders is often only one or two. We can only speculate on the reasons for this more 
favourable outcome in Britain, but the absence of a dominant incumbent, such as exists in many 
countries, and the fact that a winner takes over an existing company rather than having to put 
together staff and assets from scratch, are likely to be factors. The presence of a number of large 
privately owned bus companies who were interested in entering the rail market is another. It is 
interesting that, even though National Express has built up a fairly dominant position in the 
market, and at refranchising obviously there is an incumbent who would be expected to have 
better knowledge than other competitors, these factors seem to have done nothing to reduce 
competition, and most TOCs have changed hands at refranchising. 
 
Secondly despite the temporary setback of the collapse of service quality after Hatfield, there has 
been an extremely healthy growth of traffic and revenue. The evidence that exists suggests that 
most of this growth has resulted from external factors, particularly the state of the economy but 
also trends in car journey times and costs. However, on the best evidence we have nearly 20% of 
the growth in the early years remains unexplained by such factors. Of course this does not prove 
that the faster growth had anything to do with franchising, but our guess is that a number of 
factors linked with franchising are at work here,  more attention to preventing fares evasion and 
more sophisticated fares differentiation. It could be argued, however, that none of these factors are 
more than a continuation of developments under British Rail so it is possible that they would have 
happened anyway (although the counterfactual is hard to prove), and indeed it may be that the 
poorer performance in the early 1990s was partly due to the distractions of the privatisation 
process.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the policy on fare regulation in the post-
privatisation environment has also played a role in driving growth and, although this policy 
cannot be linked directly to franchising per se, real terms reductions in fares does represent a 
significant break from previous policy under British Rail.  
 
Moreover there would clearly have been more substantial financial problems for the TOCs had 
there been an economic recession in this period. Thus the agreements in the latest franchise 
agreements to share revenue risk may be more sensible than the original approach of placing this 
entirely in the hands of the operator. Were revenue risk to be taken completely from the operator, 
then the franchising authority would need to completely take charge of pricing, whilst an 
alternative mechanism would be needed to incentivise TOCs to grow traffic and revenue. Whilst 
this may make sense for urban or regional services with simple fares structures, we do not think it 
would be an appropriate way of handling more commercially oriented services where 
sophisticated pricing structures aimed at yield management are needed.  
 
Thirdly, franchising does not seem to have succeeded in driving down train operating company 
costs. In the early years of franchising there was a significant reduction in costs per train 
kilometre as service levels expanded, thus indicating substantial efficiency improvements; but    
more recently train operating company costs have grown substantially. This cost increase is after 
removing any effects of changes in track access charges and rolling stock leasing charges, 
although we understand that in some cases new leases have left more responsibility for train 
maintenance with the train operating company, so the comparison may not be totally valid. Other 
factors may have been extra maintenance costs associated higher specification and with poor 
reliability of new rolling stock and increased fuel prices, whilst it has been argued that the leasing 
of rolling stock from private companies has been a very expensive way of providing rolling stock 
(Shaoul, 2005). However a major increase in staffing levels as well as salaries has occurred. The 
staffing increase may be associated with more tight quality specifications, whilst there is 
anecdotal evidence that salaries may actually have been raised by competition between 
franchisees to recruit trained staff. Nevertheless, given the scale of the cost increases, this is an 
area which needs further investigation. 
 
Finally there has been a substantial problem in dealing with franchisees who have been unable to 
achieve their projected financial performance. The franchise agreements permit franchisees to 
surrender their franchise early, although they will then forfeit some or all of their performance 
bond, or to call for a viability review, as a result of which they may be granted more subsidy. The 
franchising body in Britain has been reluctant to see a train operating company become bankrupt 
or simply surrender the franchise, because of the difficulty and cost of keeping services running in 
those circumstances (NAO, 2005). They have therefore generally preferred either to renegotiate 
the terms of the franchise agreement or to enter into a short term cost plus type contract pending 
refranchising. For a number of reasons, including the change in approach to franchising in the 
financial crisis post Hatfield and the wish to postpone refranchising until neighbouring franchises 
expired to permit changes in boundaries or new investments came on line, these cost plus 
arrangements have lasted longer than would be desirable. This indeed indicates another problem 
with franchising in that it does cause some difficulties in responding to changed circumstances or 
changes in government policy. 
 
Furthermore, based on our analysis, the evidence suggests that TOCs which re-negotiated their 
contracts saw higher cost growth than other TOCs, thus providing support for the hypothesis that 
the SRA’s decision to re-negotiate contracts, and put TOCs onto cost-plus contracts, weakened 
incentives for cost control amongst the affected TOCs as compared with the rest of the sector. An 
alternative hypothesis is that it is those TOCs with the largest cost increases which ran into 
trouble, although the cost increases reported here occurred mainly after the companies had got 
into trouble and entered negotiations of their franchise agreements. Nevertheless, given the heavy 
losses incurred by operators prior to re-negotiation, and the relatively modest returns appeared 
afterwards,  
it does not therefore appear that bidders should conclude that they could make money by acting 
strategically to win franchises by unrealistic bids, although the reduction in downside risk will, 
other things being equal lead to higher bids presumably from all competitors. 
 
What is clear from the British example is that there are many problems to be faced when 
franchising rail passenger services, and in Britain the benefits from this process appear to have 
been rather limited. Costs and subsidies have not fallen as expected and, although demand growth 
has been very strong, the majority of this growth can be attributed to factors other than the 
franchising method. However, at present we consider that there is insufficient evidence to draw 
firm conclusions about why the British example failed to deliver the expected benefits, particularly on the cost side; and that it is therefore too early to draw wider policy lessons for 
other contexts. The critical issue here is to be able to explain the V-shaped TOC cost profile over 
the period since privatisation. This paper has gone part of the way, but our understanding of cost 
trends remains incomplete.  
 
One possible explanation is that the TOCs inherited an already efficient operation following the 
substantial productivity gains achieved by British Rail as a result of sectorisation in the 1980s. 
However the fact that costs started to rise again in the early 1990s, and that significant savings in 
cost per train kilometre were made in the early post privatisation period suggests at least that this 
is not a total explanation. A second hypothesis is that the cost increases were caused by the short 
term placing of many Train Operating Companies on negotiated contracts in the period around 
2001, which weakened incentives for efficiency. Whilst we have provided some evidence in 
support of this, further econometric work is necessary to improve the robustness of this finding. 
The third hypothesis is that the increase was caused by factors which had nothing to do with the 
franchising process, truly exogenous factors such as fuel prices, and other aspects of policy such 
as health and safety legislation, disability discrimination legislation and a general requirement for 
higher standards. It seems that many of these policy decisions were taken without a clear 
understanding of the cost implications and the final result may be a smaller network with fewer 
services.  
 
It is hard to be definitive on which of these three effects dominates, but we do have evidence 
which suggests that the way in which problem franchises were managed may have contributed 
substantially to the rise in costs after 1999/00. Our overall conclusion then is that passenger rail 
franchising in Britain may be regarded as a moderate success on the demand side, but that it has 
failed to achieve its objectives on the cost side. However, it should be noted that the rise in train 
operating costs in recent years has occurred at a time of considerable disruption, during which 
many other factors unrelated to franchising policy were changing at the same time. It remains to 
be seen what the re-franchising process will achieve in terms of cost reduction in a more stable 
environment. 
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   Appendix 
 
Original 
franchises 
What happened and when  New name 
1 Anglia  Originally won by GB Railways 
31 March 2004: franchise expired  
Transferred into new Great Anglia Franchise together 
with Great Eastern and most of WAGN 
NEG won the franchise for the new Great Anglia 
Franchise 
 
One 
2 Cardiff  Originally won by Prism 
September 2000: NEG took over from Prism (Interim 
Franchise agreement reached). 
Refranchising delayed to incorporate in new Wales and 
Borders franchise  
14th October 2001: franchise expanded to include parts 
of Wales and West and Central Trains. 
Name changed to Wales and Borders from that date 
2001: Management cost plus contract until franchise 
agreement completed  
September 2003: part of North Western transferred in 
8 December 2003 became Arriva Trains Wales after 
they won the franchise bid.. New franchise for 15 years 
 
Arriva Trains 
Wales 
(previously Wales 
and Borders) 
3 Central Trains  14 October 2001: part transferred to Wales and Borders 
31 December 2001: during this financial year franchise 
renegotiated. NEG paid £23m in return for higher 
subsidies of £44.6m over the rest of the franchise. 
Attempt at refranchising abandoned because of lack of 
competition. 
1 April 2004: two year franchise extension signed with 
NEG 
 
Intention now is to split it between neighbouring TOCs 
 
Central Trains 
4 Chiltern  Owned by M40 Trains (John Laing) 
March 2002: won refranchising competition - new 20 
year franchise signed with SRA 
 
Chiltern    
                                                                                         
Original 
franchises 
What happened and when  New name 
5 South Central  Originally Connex 
1999  agreement for refranchising to start early for a 20 
year contract 
26th August 2001: GOVIA took over from Connex 
having won competition for a 20 year franchise, but then 
renegotiated to 7 years. Cost plus contract pending 
completion of negotiations. 
May 2003: new franchise signed with GOVIA (until 
2009). 
27th May 2004: name changed to New Southern 
Railway 
New Southern 
Railway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Southern 
Eastern 
Originally Connex 
10 December 2002: company signed agreement with 
SRA which would give an extra £58.9m in the year to 
December 2003 but shorten the franchise 
November 2003: SRA terminated contract when Connex 
asked for another increase in subsidy 
South Eastern Trains (state owned) took over as a 
temporary measure until CTRL was open when the two 
would be franchised together. 
Refranchising won by Go Via 
 
South Eastern 
Trains 
7 Cross Country  Originally and still is Virgin Cross Country 
July 2002: franchise renegotiated to provide increased 
subsidy and to establish the basis for renegotiations 
regarding uncertainty over the WCRM. Revenue sharing 
agreements also entered into.  
Annual negotiation of subsidy 
Re-franchising currently in progress; will take over 
many routes from Central 
 
Virgin Cross 
Country 
8 Gatwick 
Express 
Originally and still is owned by NEG 
Franchise not due to expire until 2011. 
 
Gatwick Express 
9 Great Eastern  Originally First Great Eastern.  
31 March 2004: transferred to Greater Anglia Franchise 
along with Anglia and most of WAGN; NE won the 
franchise competition. 
 
One 
  
 
Original franchises  What happened and when  New name 
10 GNER  Following abandonment of refranchising on a 20 year 
contract, in 2003 the franchise was extended by two 
years to 2005  
1 May 2005: GNER won refranchising competition. 
New franchise agreement (seven year deal+3 years 
subject to performance) signed with incumbent 
 
GNER 
11 Great Western  Originally First Great Western 
Franchise due to expire  2006. 
Refranchising competition won by First. 
Great Western 
12 Island Line  Original franchise was 5 years.  
2001: extended to by 2 years to 2003 
10 December 2003: Stagecoach signed three year deal to 
February 2007  
Extended to be coterminous with South West franchise 
(also Stagecoach) 
 
Island Line 
13  c2c  Originally franchise was to run until 2011 (subject to 
delivery) 
One of the Prism TOCs 
2001: December 2001 accounts, record a franchise 
amendment payment of £3.5m paid to SRA in return for 
a revised franchise agreement involving more subsidy. 
NEG took over from that point. 
 
c2c 
14 Merseyrail  MTL won original franchise but in financial difficulties 
 Arriva  took over pending refranchising. Became Arriva 
Trains Merseyside 
2001: put on to cost plus contract  
20 July 2003: new franchise agreement signed with 
Serco NedRailways (expires 2028) following 
refranchising. 
No longer under the control of the SRA (looked after by 
PTE) 
Merseyrail  
15 Midland 
Mainline 
NE won original franchise 
Original franchise to run until 2006 (subject to delivery) 
August 2000: deal agreed to extend franchise by two 
years to 2008 
The franchise premia that would have been paid between 
2001 and 2006 now to be invested directly in Midland 
Mainline 
And NEG agreed to accelerate investment in the 
franchise 
 
Midland Mainline 
    
 
Original 
franchises 
What happened and when  New name 
16 North 
Western 
First won original franchise 
March 2001: company re-negotiated deal with SRA  
Paid franchise amendment costs of £38m 
Put onto cost plus contract 
September 2003: part transferred to Wales and Borders 
February 2004: part transferred to Transpennine Express. 
Balance to Northern Franchise 
Refranchised TPe won by First; Northern by 
SERCO/Nedrail 
 
None. Doesn’t 
exist post February 
2004 
17 Northern 
Spirit 
MTL won original franchise 
MTL in financial difficulties; deal done for Arriva to take 
over.2000 
In 2001 put onto a cost plus management contract 
February 2004: part transferred to Transpennine Express 
October 2004: balance to become Northern Franchise 
together with North Western 
New franchise won by Serco Ned Railways (8 years 9 
months) 
 
Northern Rail 
(formerly Arriva 
Trains Northern) 
18 Scotrail  Was National Express Group 
2001: deal done to increase subsidies over the remainder 
of the franchise (due to end in 2003/04). Scotrail paid 
£36m for this, to get £70m higher subsidies 
October 2004: new franchise awarded to First (7 years 
+3) after refranchising competition 
No longer under the control of SRA (looked after by 
Scottish Executive) 
 
Scotrail 
19 Silverlink  Originally won by NEG  
September 2004: two year extension agreed to go to 2006 
Press release from NEG states that level of subsidy not 
materially affected (£120m per year over two years: c.f. 
£50m in year end December 2003) 
 
Silverlink 
20 South West  
 
Original franchise to end in 2002/03; Stagecoach owned 
November 2002: one year extension agreed to 2004 
 
further extension to February 2007 (same end as Island 
Line) 
 
 
South West Trains 
 
 
 Original 
franchises 
What happened and when  New name 
21 Thameslink 
 
Original franchise to end in 2003/04 
Owned by GOVIA 
2004: two year extension agreed (with revenue share 
mechanism) 
New franchise from 2006: to merge with Great Northern 
(part of WAGN) 
Won by First 
Thameslink 
22 Thames 
Trains 
 
 
Original franchise to run to 2003/04 
Was owned by Go Ahead Group 
Two year franchise (to run to 2006) awarded to First after 
inviting bids from Go Ahead and First, to bring the end 
date up to that of GW, in the light of the future: proposal to 
merge with Great Western and Wessex (post 2006) 
 
Thames Trains 
23 WAGN 
 
September 2000: bought by NEG from Prism (along with 
Cardiff and Wales and West) 
March 2001: deal done with SRA on subsidy levels for 
Great Northern part of the franchise: cost plus arrangement 
March 2004: services split, with West Anglia parts going to 
the new Greater Anglia Franchise  
March 2004: two year extension agreed to Great Northern 
franchise (the balance). Results in subsidy falling by £6m 
to c. £19m a year. 
Great Northern to be merged with Thameslink in 2006. 
New franchise won by First. 
One and Great 
Northern 
24 Wales and 
West 
 
September 2000: acquired by NEG from Prism 
January 2001: NEG negotiated higher subsidies (cost plus 
arrangement) 
14th October 2001: parts transferred to Wales and Borders.  
Renamed Wessex Trains from October 2001 
2004: franchise extended until 2006 
To be merged with Great Western and Thames Trains 
 
Wessex Trains 
25 West Coast  Originally and still is Virgin  
July 2002: franchise renegotiated to provide increased 
subsidy and to establish the basis for renegotiations 
regarding uncertainty over the WCRM. Revenue sharing 
agreements also entered into.  
Annual negotiation of subsidy 
 
Virgin West 
Coast 
    
 
Original 
franchises 
What happened and when  New name 
26 
Transpennine 
Express 
 
February 2004: new franchise created from North Western 
and Northern 
Awarded to First Group and Keolis (8 years + 5 year 
extension) 
 
Transpennine 
Express 
Data sources 
 
TOC accounts 
SRA Strategic Plan 2002 
General web searches 
ASLEF web site lists current status of all franchises 
TAS Rail Monitor 
 
 
 
 